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Abstract
Clearinghouse models of online pricing—such as Varian (1980), Rosenthal
(1980), Narasimhan (1988), and Baye-Morgan (2001)—view a price comparison
site as an “information clearinghouse” where shoppers and loyals obtain price
and product information to make online purchases. These models predict that
the responsiveness of a ﬁrm’s demand to a change in its price depends on the
number of sellers and whether the price change results in the ﬁrm charging the
lowest price in the market. Using a unique ﬁrm-level dataset from Kelkoo.com
(Yahoo!’s European price comparison site), we examine these predictions by
providing estimates of the demand for PDAs. Our results indicate that the
number of competing sellers and both the ﬁrm’s location on the screen and
relative ranking in the list of prices are important determinants of an online
retailer’s demand. We ﬁnd that an online monopolist faces an elasticity of
demand of about -2, while sellers competing against 10 other sellers face an
elasticity of about -6. We also ﬁnd empirical evidence of a discontinuous jump
in a ﬁrm’s demand as its price declines from the second-lowest to the lowest
price. Our estimates suggest that about 13% of the consumers at Kelkoo are
“shoppers” who purchase from the seller oﬀering the lowest price. 
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Clearinghouse models of online pricing￿ such as Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), Narasimhan
(1988), and Baye-Morgan (2001)￿ view a price comparison site as an ￿information clearing-
house￿where shoppers and loyals obtain price and product information to make online pur-
chases. These models predict that the responsiveness of a ￿rm￿ s demand to a change in its
price depends on the number of sellers and whether the price change results in the ￿rm charging
the lowest price in the market. Using a unique ￿rm-level dataset from Kelkoo.com (Yahoo!￿ s
European price comparison site), we examine these predictions by providing estimates of the
demand for PDAs. Our results indicate that the number of competing sellers and both the
￿rm￿ s location on the screen and relative ranking in the list of prices are important determi-
nants of an online retailer￿ s demand. We ￿nd that an online monopolist faces an elasticity of
demand of about ￿2, while sellers competing against 10 other sellers face an elasticity of about
￿6. We also ￿nd empirical evidence of a discontinuous jump in a ￿rm￿ s demand as its price
declines from the second-lowest to the lowest price. Our estimates suggest that about 13% of
the consumers at Kelkoo are ￿shoppers￿who purchase from the seller o⁄ering the lowest price.
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11 Introduction
A ￿rm￿ s demand in the online marketplace￿ particularly at price comparison sites such as
Shopper.com, Nextag, and Kelkoo.com￿ fundamentally di⁄ers from demand at most phys-
ical marketplaces. One of the key di⁄erences￿ ￿rst noted by Baye and Morgan (2001) but
certainly anticipated by the early works of Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), Shilony (1977),
and Narasimhan (1988)￿ stems from the fact that consumers typically obtain a complete
list of the prices charged by di⁄erent sellers before making their purchase decision. As a
consequence, a ￿rm enjoys a discontinuous jump in demand when it succeeds in charging
the lowest price because it instantly attracts the price-sensitive ￿shopper￿segment of the
market. Moreover, unlike traditional retail markets where ￿rms like Wal Mart and Target
compete and there is little turnover in the identity of the ￿rm charging the lowest price (it
is almost always Wal Mart), the identify of the low-price seller frequently changes in online
markets (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2004b; Ellison and Ellison, 2004). Thus, it would
seem to be important to account for the impact of shoppers when estimating online demand.
The online marketplace also di⁄ers from its physical cousin in the volatility in the number
of competing sellers. In conventional retail markets, the number of ￿rms competing for cus-
tomers in (say) Walnut Creek, California change infrequently owing to the barriers to entry
and exit associated with setting up a physical retail location. In the online world, change
comes faster. This is particularly true in the marketplace de￿ned by a price comparison
site. Here, the number of ￿rms listing prices for a given product changes almost daily (see
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004a). Indeed, as pointed out by Baye and Morgan (2001),
this variation in the degree of rivalry of a given online market is essential for ￿rms to avoid
pure Bertrand competition in these markets and for the information ￿gatekeeper￿ ￿ the en-
tity running the price comparison site￿ to pro￿tably operate its site. Thus, it would seem
to be important to account for the degree of rivalry￿ the number of competing sellers￿ in
estimating demand online. Among other things, theory indicates that the number of com-
petitors is a key determinant of ￿rm-level elasticities of demand: The greater the number of
rivals, the more elastic is a ￿rm￿ s demand.
A third way online markets di⁄er from conventional markets is in the changing location
2of ￿rms. In conventional retail markets, the physical real estate a retailer occupies changes
infrequently, and identifying the component of the ￿value-added￿by its physical location
is di¢ cult to disentangle from other elements of the retailer￿ s characteristics. In contrast,
￿virtual￿real estate in the online world changes rapidly. For instance, in purchasing ￿ad-
words￿(advertising space at the side of search queries on Google￿ s site), retailers realize the
advantage conferred to being the ￿rst listing on the page￿ and bid aggressively to obtain
such a position. At any moment, a retailer can ￿nd itself displaced from this ￿prime￿real
estate to a less favorable screen location. Similar locational advantages presumably accrue
to ￿rms with the topmost listings at price comparison sites, such as Kelkoo.com.
The rapidly changing nature of the online marketplace￿ the numbers of competing ￿rms,
identity of the low-price ￿rm, and a ￿rm￿ s screen locations￿ presents both a challenge and
an opportunity in estimating demand in online markets. The challenge is that if one fails to
properly account for discontinuities in a ￿rm￿ s demand when it charges the lowest price, and
the impact on a ￿rm￿ s demand of its screen location and the number of rivals, one might
obtain biased estimates of demand. The opportunities stem from the dynamic nature of the
data. Variation in the identity of the low priced ￿rm enables one to disentangle the demand
jump stemming from price sensitive shoppers from other determinants of demand. In con-
ventional retail, such as in the competition between Target and Wal Mart, this identi￿cation
is most di¢ cult. A second opportunity arises from the frequently changing number of com-
petitors, which enables identi￿cation of the marginal impact of the number of rivals on a
￿rm￿ s demand elasticity (and hence its markup). Obtaining these types of estimates from
the physical marketplace is more di¢ cult. Finally, the variation in screen locations enables
identi￿cation of the value of the virtual real estate separately from ￿rm characteristics.
Before summarizing how we seek to overcome these challenges and take advantage of the
opportunities described above, it is important to point out a ￿nal challenge typically faced
by researchers seeking to estimate demand in online markets. Clearly, the ideal dataset for
demand estimation would include actual quantity data; however, owing to the fragmented
nature of the e-retail marketplace and the proprietary nature of data, this is often a formi-
dable challenge. Indeed, we know of only one paper, Ellison and Ellison (2004), that has
been able to obtain quantity data, and even here the study is limited by the fact that the
3data is only for one of the many sellers competing at a particular price comparison site. More
often, all that is available is clicks (or leads) data at a price comparison site￿ data on the
number of customers that clicked on a particular seller￿ s price displayed at the price com-
parison site. Customers clicking through, in this fashion, are then redirected to the seller￿ s
site to purchase the product.
We address these challenges and opportunities. Our paper demonstrates that theoretical
￿clearinghouse￿models of online competition can be used, in conjunction with identifying
restrictions we set forth in Proposition 1, to estimate online demand using clicks data. In
particular, we show that one can use existing pseudo-maximum likelihood as well as stan-
dard maximum likelihood techniques speci￿cally designed for count data to obtain consistent
estimates of underlying demand parameters (including demand elasticities). We then apply
these techniques to unique clickthrough data for 18 personal digital assistants (PDAs) ob-
tained from Yahoo!s European price comparison site, Kelkoo.com. Consistent with what
one might conjecture based on the challenges we identi￿ed above, we ￿nd evidence that it
is indeed important to account for demand discontinuities, the number of rival sellers, and
other determinants of demand such as screen location when estimating a ￿rm￿ s demand in
online markets.
More speci￿cally, our econometric results reveal that it is important to account for the
￿jump￿in a ￿rm￿ s demand when it o⁄ers the lowest price. We ￿nd that a ￿rm o⁄ering the
best price enjoys a 60 percent increase in demand compared to what it would have enjoyed
had it not charged the lowest price. Perhaps more importantly, failing to account for the
jump in demand leads to elasticity estimates that are about twice those obtained allowing for
demand discontinuities. Our results also reveal that a ￿rm￿ s elasticity of demand (apart from
the jump discussed above) is more elastic in online markets where competition is keener. A
monopoly seller faces an elasticity of demand of about ￿2.5, while in the most competitive
markets we analyzed (15 sellers), the elasticity of demand for a representative ￿rm￿ s product
is about ￿6.0. We are also able to identify the e⁄ect of other determinants of demand￿ such
as screen location￿ on ￿rm demand. Our results imply that ￿rms lose about 15% of their
business for every competitor listed above them on the screen.
Our results are related to a variety of papers in the literature. As noted earlier, Ellison
4& Ellison (2004) use sales data for computer memory chips obtained from a single store,
which listed on Pricewatch.com. The emphasis of their paper is on obfuscation and cross
price elasticities between low and higher qualities of the same product o⁄ered by the ￿rm;
however they also indirectly obtain price elasticity estimates ranging from ￿25 to ￿40. In
contrast, our analysis uses data from the complete set of ￿rms listing prices across a broader
selection of products, and where obfuscation is not prevalent. Ghose, Smith and Telang
(2004) impute the sales of used books from the website of Amazon.com, which lists price
o⁄ers for used books from many alternative and independent retailers. Using a multinomial
logit model they estimate a price elasticity of ￿4.7, and note that the lowest priced o⁄ers
receive a discontinuously higher proportion of sales. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) rather
ingeniously impute price elasticities for new books at two bookstores (Amazon and Barnes
& Noble) using prices and relative sales rankings - obtained directly from the retailers￿web
sites rather than through a price comparison site (where price sensitivity may be expected
to be greater). They estimate price elasticities of -0.6 for Amazon and -4 for Barnes and
Noble, but these estimates do appear to be sensitive to the particular estimating technique
adopted. Using a similar methodology, Ghose et al. (2004) estimate the price elasticity for
new books at Amazon to be -1.2.
Our analysis complements these studies by o⁄ering a methodology to directly estimate
elasticities and to disentangle the impact on demand elasticities of: (1) discontinuous jumps
at the lowest price; (2) variation in the number of competing ￿rms; and (3) variation in
screen location of price quotes.1 Our paper rationalizes the disparate elasticity estimates
(which range from ￿0:6 to ￿40) obtained in various online markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next Section describes our data and
provides an overview of the shopping environment at Kelkoo. In Section 3 we present the
theory underlying our estimation methodology. Section 4 provides demand estimates based
on individual as well as pooled products under the assumption that demand is continuous.
These latter estimates are nested as a special case of the discontinuous demand speci￿cation,
which is detailed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1 Pricewatch lists retailers in order of price, with the cheapest at the top of the screen. Thus, it is not
possible to separately identify price ranking and screen location e⁄ects. Ellison and Ellison do not monitor
the total number of ￿rms listing prices at any particular time.
52 Data
The data used in this paper was obtained from the price listing service, Kelkoo, which is
owned by Yahoo! According to Yahoo!, Kelkoo is the largest price listing service in world,
operating in eight European countries and is recognized as one of the six most accessed
web-sites in Europe. Within the UK, Kelkoo is the third largest retail website and attracts
over 10 million individual users per month￿ more than twice that of its closest rival. Kelkoo
would seem to be representative of the overall UK e-retail marketplace. Over 1,800 individual
retailers￿ including 18 of the 20 largest online retailers in the UK￿ list prices on Kelkoo.2
Consumers interested in purchasing a broad range of products can access the Kelkoo site
to obtain information about the product, a list of retailers selling the product, and the total
prices charged for the product, including taxes and shipping charges. Consumers interested
in making a purchase must ￿ click￿on the ￿rm￿ s link at the Kelkoo site. They are then sent to
the retailer￿ s site, where the ￿nal purchase is made. Figure 1 illustrates a typical screenshot
for the HP iPAQ H5550 PDA. Notice that consumers are provided with a brief description
of the product, a list of retailers selling the product, along with the total price including
VAT and shipping charge (￿ P&P￿in Kelkoo￿ s terminology). Our analysis is based on the
total price￿ the actual ￿nal amount a consumer purchasing the product would be charged,
inclusive of taxes and shipping charges. We cleaned the data obtained from Kelkoo to ensure
that our analysis is based on listings of products that are identical in every respect (including
condition).3
Kelkoo￿ s revenue is generated by charging retailers a fee for each referral made; that is,
each time a consumer clicks on the link at the Kelkoo site to a retailer￿ s site. The fee charged
by Kelkoo varies across products and retailers but is typically in the range of £0.20 to £1.00
per click, and is independent of whether a sale is subsequently made. Consumers are not
charged for using Kelkoo￿ s site.
Our data comes from referrals made through ￿menu prompted￿results screens. A con-
sumer arrives at these screens by navigating the products menu, moving from broader to
2 Data taken from Hitwise Statistics and company information provided by Kelkoo.
3 Arguably, one could simply add product controls for the small number of ￿variants￿(e.g. refurbished,
extra memory, etc.) of a given PDA in the sample. However, the number of these items was to permit this
approach.
6narrower product classes until arriving at the particular product in which she is interested.4
For example, from Computers and Software in the opening page menu, a consumer would
click and move to PDAs, where the menu has groupings by brand, price range, memory,
weight and operating system. From this list, she would choose a speci￿c PDA and be pre-
sented with a list of sellers and their prices. There are a number of reasons we opted for
these data. First, Kelkoo generates roughly 45% of all its leads through consumers compar-
ing prices in this fashion. Second, consumers using menu prompted searches are presented
with price listings where the set and order of retailers displayed is unilaterally determined
by Kelkoo and is identical for all consumers at any given time. Finally, the information
displayed is veri￿ed and updated daily. Unlike many other price comparison sites, the or-
der of retailers listed on these pages is neither auctioned or sold directly to retailers and is
independent of the price quoted and the speed with which the retailers respond to a price
request. Consequently, as far as both consumers and retailers are concerned, the order of
price quotations on any speci￿c screen is exogenous.
It is clear from Figure 1 that there is considerable variation in both prices charged and
the characteristics of retailers on the site. Retailers listing on Kelkoo include retailers with a
large brick and mortar presence, such as Comet and PC World, well-known online retailers
such as Amazon and Dell, as well as less known online retailers such as Big Grey Cat.
Kelkoo maintains a log of information on each ￿ referral￿made.5 The log registers the
retailer name, product name, price information, time of referral, location of the retailer on
the screen and a cookie speci￿c reference. For this study, Kelkoo provided us with daily data
extracted from their log for 18 speci￿c PDAs for the period from 18 September 2003 to 6
January 2004, a period which generated over 40% of Kelkoo￿ s annual tra¢ c.6
This tra¢ c amounted to 39,568 leads generated via 20,509 separate ￿cookies.￿The ma-
jority (60.1%) of cookies generated only single leads, while a small number of cookies (0.56%)
4 One might worry about a potential selection issue using this data since the search technique adopted by
the consumer is endogenous. For this reason, we examined the robustness of our results by using data based
on referrals generated using alternative methods. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in
the paper.
5 Throughout the paper we use the terms ￿ referral,￿￿ lead,￿and ￿ click￿interchangeably.
6 Kelkoo is bound to protect the anonymity of retailers in disclosing information about the referrals they
obtain. In providing the information from their log ￿les, the retailers were identi￿ed in the dataset by codes,
and by some key characteristics, such as whether they had a brick and mortar presence.
7generated a great many (>10) leads each. To avoid the potential problem of over-weighting
consumers who generated multiple leads, we restrict our analysis only to the last clicks data
for each cookie. 7 Over the period of the study there were 6,151 individual product, retailer
and day speci￿c price listings across the 18 PDAs monitored. For each of these daily listings,
we determined the number of (last-click) referrals per day, for each PDA sold by each seller.
Finally, we note that for all products in our sample, the complete list of price o⁄ers was
always displayed on a single page. Thus, no consumer was required to click more than once
to view the entire list of ￿rms selling a speci￿c PDA on a speci￿c day.
2.1 Summary Statistics
Our analysis is based on the 18 models of PDAs listed in Table 1. These include di⁄erent
models of Palm, HP, Sony, and Toshiba PDAs, and span a wide range in prices. The lowest
priced item is the Palm Handspring Treo, which has a median price of about £130. The
most expensive product in our dataset is the Sony Clie nz90, which has a median price of
about £537. An initial inspection of the prices in our dataset suggested that prices in the
UK were considerably higher than in the US. To examine this hypothesis, we obtained data
from the US price comparison site Shopper.com for the same time period and the same set
of PDAs. A comparison of the US and UK prices listed in Table 1 con￿rm that UK prices
are indeed higher than those in the US. Part of the di⁄erence in prices between the two
countries stems from the fact that the UK prices include 17.5% sales tax (VAT), unlike US
prices which are quoted exclusive of taxes. But even after deducting the VAT, the median
retail price for PDAs sold online in the UK is about 20% higher than in the US. Part of the
explanation may lie in di⁄ering market structures￿ the average number of retailers listing a
PDA at Kelkoo is less than 4, while the corresponding number of sellers at Shopper.com is
about 24.
Table 2 summarizes our data, which consists of daily prices and referrals for 18 PDAs
o⁄ered by 19 retailers. Referrals are fairly evenly distributed across the period of our study.
Firms with a brick and mortar presence obtained 29% of the total number of referrals.
7 We also performed the analysis reported below using data on all clicks as well as only ￿rst-clicks data
and obtained qualitatively similar results.
8Weekdays generated the most tra¢ c, with an average of 350 referrals each day, while the
weekends generated about three-quarters of this number (cf. Figure 2).
There are very substantial di⁄erences in the number of referrals enjoyed by di⁄erent
retailers, ranging on a per-product basis from zero to 36 per day. The median number of
referrals a ￿rm received on a given product was 2. In a substantial number of instances,
a ￿rm received 0, 1, or 2 referrals for a given product on a given date. The average price
was about £305 and the average shipping charge was about £4. The number of ￿rms listing
prices on a given product-date varies considerably, ranging from 1 to 15 ￿rms with a standard
deviation of 2.93.
Figure 3 suggests that price and screen location play a potentially important role in
determining the business enjoyed by particular online retailers. Consumers appear to be
very sensitive to price, as is evidenced by the dramatic decline in leads enjoyed by ￿rms
o⁄ering less favorable prices. Likewise, consumers tend to frequent ￿rms that are listed
above others on the screen. While screen location is not determined by price, it is possible
that the results displayed in Figure 3 are the result of spurious correlation between screen
location and price. We deal with this issue formally in Section 4 of the paper.
3 Estimation Methodology
In this section, we describe our methodology for estimating the impact of various explanatory
variables on ￿rm demand at the Kelkoo site. Given that we only observe clicks and not ￿nal
purchases, we o⁄er identi￿cation restrictions on demand that, if satis￿ed, allow us to estimate
￿rm demand elasticities even though we do not have ￿nal sales data. In the second subsection,
we describe the pseudo maximum likelihood procedures which permit us to obtain consistent
estimates of various elasticities of demand.
3.1 Identi￿cation Restrictions
Recall that, to purchase a product, a consumer visiting the Kelkoo site must ￿rst process the
information contained on the site and decide whether, and on which ￿rm, to click. Following
this, a consumer clicking through to the merchant￿ s site obtains additional information about
9the desirability of purchasing the product and ultimately decides whether to buy or not.
Thus, demand can be decomposed into two parts: the click generating process and the
process of converting leads to sales. The process of generating leads depends on a number of
factors, the most important of which are highlighted in Figure 4. As the ￿gure shows, leads
depend on the price a ￿rm charges, market structure￿ the number of other ￿rms o⁄ering
the same product and the prices these ￿rms are charging, the characteristics of the ￿rm,
timing, and the location of the ￿rm￿ s listing on the ￿page.￿ Formally, let X denote this
and other information a consumer obtains directly from the Kelkoo site. Note that X may
include dummy variables to control for product-speci￿c characteristics (some products are
more popular and receive more clicks, on average, than others), ￿rm characteristics (some
￿rms may have a brick-and-mortar presence while others do not), and time e⁄ects (￿rms
may receive fewer clicks on weekends or products may exhibit life-cycle e⁄ects that cause
clicks to vary systematically over time). Let the number of leads that ￿rm i receives, Qi ,




where we use a Lebesque integral to account for the fact that Qi is discrete. Based on
the information in X￿ and this information alone￿ a representative consumer can decide to
close his or her window or to click through to a particular merchant.
A consumer who clicks through to a ￿rms￿site then receives additional information (de-
noted Zi) that in￿ uences her decision to purchase. This information might include the ￿rm￿ s
attempt at obfuscation along the lines described by Ellison and Ellison (2004), the visual
attractiveness and usability of the ￿rm￿ s site, whether the ￿rm is o⁄ering any guarantees on
the product over and above those provided by the manufacturer, the exact restocking and
return policies of the ￿rm, and so on. Of course, a consumer￿ s perceptions of these factors
may be colored by the previous information, X; obtained on the Kelkoo site. Thus, the
probability that a click is converted into a sale is
Pr(saleijZi;X) = Gi (Zi;X)
and, combining these expressions, the expected demand for a given product sold by ￿rm i is
E [DijX;Zi] = Gi (Zi;X) ￿ E [QijX]
10Suppose that we are interested in the impact on the demand for a given product sold
by ￿rm i from some explanatory variable, xi: It is useful to rewrite X = (xi;X1) where X1
represents all components of X other than xi: The following proposition o⁄ers conditions
in which one may identify the impact of xi on ￿rm i￿ s demand when only leads data are
available.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Gi (Z;(xi;X1)) = Gi (Z;(x0
i;X1)) for all xi;x0
i: Then one can
use clicks data to identify the elasticities of demand with respect to xi (when demand is
di⁄erentiable with respect to xi) as well as the percentage change in demand resulting from
a given change in xi (when demand is not di⁄erentiable with respect to xi).
Proof. We ￿rst prove the result for the di⁄erentiable case. Recall that log expected
demand is given by
lnE [DijX;Zi] = lnGi (Zi;X) + lnE [QijX]









and since Gi (Z;(xi;X1)) = Gi (Z;(x0
i;X1)) for all xi;x0
i:; then
@ lnGi(Zi;X)







Next, we prove the result for the non-di⁄erentiable case.
%￿E [Dij(xi;X1);Zi] =





E [Qijxi;X1] ￿ E [Qijx0
i;X1]
E [Qijxi;X1]
where we have again used the fact that Gi (Z;(xi;X1)) = Gi (Z;(x0
i;X1)) for all xi;x0
i: This
completes the proof.
Two special cases of Proposition 1 are worth noting. First, when xi is ￿rm i￿ s price we
can, in principle, estimate own price demand elasticities purely through leads data. Second,
when xi is a discrete variable (such as a dummy variable), the proposition implies that we
can use estimates based on clicks data to infer the percentage impact of a discrete change in
xi on demand.
11It is important to note, however, that even if the identifying restriction stated in Propo-
sition 1 is not satis￿ed, we are still in a position to examine the impact of various aspects
of the leads generating process described in Figure 4 on the leads a ￿rm receives from
Kelkoo. Even in this latter case, one may be able to use a priori information along with
clickthrough elasticities to obtain bounds on demand elasticities. For instance, if one has
reason to believe that conversion rates are increasing in xi, it follows that elasticities based








In the sequel, we assume that the condition of Proposition 1 are satis￿ed, so that we can
identify relevant demand parameters purely through clicks data.
3.2 Data Generating Process for Leads
In light of the identi￿cation restrictions in Proposition 1, the next step in estimating demand
parameters is the speci￿cation of the underlying stochastic process generating leads: For the
reasons discussed below, we use a pseudo-maximum likelihood approach that does not require
us to make speci￿c assumptions about the underlying distribution generating Qi; instead,
we merely assume the underlying stochastic process has ￿nite mean, given by
E [QijX] = exp[X￿] (2)
In order to estimate the vector of unknown parameters, ￿, one must account for the fact
our clicks data consist of integer numbers of clicks. In fact, as shown in Table 2, over 50
percent of the data consist of observations where ￿rms selling a given product received two
or fewer clicks on a given day. For this reason, analysis of these data require regression
techniques suitable for count data. Thanks to recent advances in the econometrics of count
data, a variety of estimation techniques are available. One approach is to make a speci￿c
distributional assumption regarding the underlying stochastic process (Poisson or negative
binomial, for instance), and use standard maximum likelihood methods to obtain estimates of
the underlying parameters, ￿. Conditional on the underlying distributional assumption being
correct, one obtains consistent estimates and standard errors and may perform standard
hypothesis tests on ￿. Unfortunately, even if the mean speci￿cation in equation (2) is correct,
12it is known (cf. Gourieroux, et al. (1984a,b); Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) that the resulting
maximum likelihood estimates of ￿ and/or the standard errors will be inconsistent if the
true stochastic process is di⁄erent from that used to obtain maximum likelihood estimates.
For this reason, we adopt the pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) approach due to
Gourieroux, et al. (1984a,b) that has received renewed interest due to Cameron and Trivedi
(1998) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001). Roughly, Gourieroux, et al. (1984a) show that so long
as the mean speci￿cation in equation (2) is correct, any maximum likelihood estimator for ￿
obtained by maximizing the likelihood function based on the linear exponential class will be
consistent for ￿ even if the underlying distribution used to obtain the MLE is misspeci￿ed.
Since the Poisson MLE is in the linear exponential class but the negative binomial and other
common speci￿cations used for count data are not (when the parameters of the assumed
distribution are unknown), Hall and Ziedonis (2001) use the Poisson-based PML approach
to obtain consistent estimates of ￿.
While the Gourieroux, et al. results imply that the ML estimates of ￿ based on a
Poisson distribution are consistent even when the underlying data generating process for the
Qi ￿ s are not Poisson, the resulting ML estimates of the variance-covariance matrix are not
consistent if the underlying distribution is not, in fact, Poisson. For this reason, Gourieroux,
et al. propose what they call pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation: The estimator of ￿ is
based on the ￿rst-order conditions for maximizing the likelihood function based on a Poisson
distribution, but the distribution of the estimator is not based on the Poisson distributional
assumption. Our approach is similar to that taken by Hall and Ziedonis (2001): we obtain
consistent estimates of the variance matrix without specifying a speci￿c functional form
for the variance (as would be required if one used the negative binomial) by using robust
standard errors.
In short, by using pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates based on a Poisson distribu-
tional assumption, we obtain a consistent estimate of ￿ even if the underlying distribution is
not Poisson. By using robust standard errors, we obtain consistent estimates of the variance
of this estimate. In contrast, maximum likelihood methods based on a speci￿c distributional
assumption (such as the negative binomial) would lead to more e¢ cient estimates if the
speci￿cation of the data generating process is correct, but inconsistent estimates if the dis-
13tribution is not correct. Thus, as in Hall and Ziedonis (2001), our preference for the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood approach stems from its robustness to potential misspeci￿ca-
tion. As discussed below, we also provide MLE estimates in the Appendix based on speci￿c
distributional assumptions, including the negative binomial (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998),
as well as speci￿cations that allow for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity (using both random
and ￿rm speci￿c e⁄ects, as in Griliches, Hausman, and Hall, 1986). It is reassuring that our
results are robust to these alternative speci￿cations.
4 Continuous Demand Models
In this section we provide estimates of a representative ￿rm￿ s demand under the assumption
that each ￿rm￿ s demand is a continuous function of its price. As noted in the introduction,
this is the conventional way of estimating demand, and has led to ￿rm elasticity estimates
ranging from ￿ 0.6 (in the relatively concentrated online market for books) to about ￿40
(in a highly competitive online market for computer memory). The main message of this
section is to show that di⁄erences in seller concentration across di⁄erent PDAs is useful in
explaining variations in ￿rm elasticities.
4.1 Estimates by Product
As a starting point, we pool across ￿rms (i) and dates (t); but estimate separate elasticities
for each of the 18 di⁄erent models of PDAs in our data using the pseudo-maximum likelihood
procedure described above. Speci￿cally, we assume
E [QijtjXijt] = exp
￿
￿j lnpijt + ￿jX1;ijt
￿
; (3)
where Qijt is the number clicks ￿rm i received on product j at time t, pijt is the total price
(including VAT and shipping) ￿rm i charged for product j at time t, and X1;ijt is a vector
of controls. Notice that, under our maintained hypothesis that the identifying restrictions
in Proposition 1 hold, ￿j is the own price elasticity of demand for a representative seller of
a model j PDA. Table 3 reports the results, which include the following controls:
14Screen Location. As we discussed above, when a price listing is located nearer to the top
of the screen, it tends to receive more clicks. Clicks decrease monotonically as the position
on the screen gets lower. Hence, we have included a linear screen location control to absorb
this e⁄ect.
Weekend. As displayed in Figure 2, there are systematically fewer clicks on weekends
than on weekdays. Hence, we have included a weekend dummy variable to control for this
e⁄ect on demand.
Month. Our dataset covers, in part, the fourth quarter of the year, which traditionally
the strongest part of the retail season. As a result, we include month dummies to control
for seasonal e⁄ects on demand.
Notice that 13 of the estimated own price elasticities in Table 3 are statistically signif-
icantly di⁄erent from zero at the 1 percent level, with values ranging from ￿1.75 (for the
Toshiba E770) to ￿14.691 (for the HP Compaq iPAQ 1940). These estimates vary widely
across PDAs. In interpreting these results, and to better understand the widely di⁄erent esti-
mates obtained for di⁄erent models of PDAs, it is important to recognize that these estimates
are ￿rm elasticities ￿ not market elasticities. One of the key determinants of the elasticity
of demand is the availability of substitutes ￿the more sellers o⁄ering the same product, the
more elastic is the demand facing a ￿rm selling that product. It is well-known, for instance, in
a symmetric n-￿rm capacity-constrained price-setting environment, the elasticity of demand
facing an individual ￿rm (EF) is n times the market elasticity (EM): EF = nEM. If this is
the case and di⁄erent numbers of ￿rms sold di⁄erent types of PDAs, the ￿rm elasticities of
demand would vary widely across PDA models even if the market elasticity of demand were
the same for each model of PDA.
Thus, it seems useful to investigate the relationship between our elasticity estimates and
the average number of ￿rms listing a price, across PDA models. This relationship is plotted
in Figure 5. The estimates are divided into those that do not obtain statistical signi￿cance
at conventional levels, which are shown as open circles and those that attain signi￿cance
at the 1% level, which are shown as ￿lled-in diamonds. As the ￿gure shows, there is a
strong negative relationship between the elasticity estimates for each of the products and
the average number of ￿rms o⁄ering price quotes for the product. This suggests the need for
15controlling for ￿market structure￿among PDAs, were one to pool across all products. Thus,
even if the market elasticity of demand were identical for each of the 18 models of PDAs,
￿rms selling di⁄erent PDAs would face di⁄ering elasticities of demand given the inverse
relationship between the elasticities of demand the number of ￿rms selling each product.
4.2 Pooled Estimates
We now report estimates obtained by pooling across ￿rms (i) and dates (t); and di⁄erent
models of PDAs using the pseudo-maximum likelihood procedure described earlier. Here
we consider two models: a baseline model that does not allow elasticities to vary with the
number of sellers, and a more general model that takes into account our preliminary ￿ndings
in the individual product speci￿cations. The baseline model assumes
E [QijtjXijt] = exp[￿ lnpijt + ￿X1;ijt]: (4)
The controls for this speci￿cation include all of those in equation (3) as well as following:
PDA Model. As the previous speci￿cation revealed, there are di⁄erences in clicks for each
of the di⁄erent PDA models. For instance, PDAs di⁄er from one another in terms of their
popularity, their operating system, various performance characteristics, add-on software, and
so on. Thus we include dummy variables for each of the 18 PDA models.
PDA Model-Month Interactions. In addition, the popularity of a PDA varies depending
on new entrants in the PDA product space. As technology and performance improve with
the introduction of new models, the popularity of an existing PDA can decline￿ sometimes
dramatically. To control for these e⁄ects, we include dummies interacting each of the 18
PDAs with the month dummies mentioned above. This, in principle, allows for di⁄ering
PDA ￿life cycle￿e⁄ects.
Bricks and Clicks Retailer. Some of the ￿rms in our dataset have an established physical
presence in addition to their online presence. These are commonly referred to as ￿bricks and
clicks￿retailers. Clearly, the reputation as well as the ease of returns and accumulated brand
equity of these retailers are likely to be di⁄erent from those with only an online presence.
Thus, we include a dummy variable for whether a particular ￿rm is a bricks and clicks retailer
or not.
16With these controls in place, we report pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates (based on
a Poisson likelihood function) using equation (4) in the column labeled ￿Model 1￿in Table
4. The bottom of Table 4 also reports the results of a Lagrange multiplier test for over
dispersion of the negative binomial (2) type (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1990). This is a
test of the null hypothesis that the mean and variance of the click generating process are
equal, as would be the case were the data generating process truly coming from a Poisson
distribution. As the table shows, we overwhelmingly reject this hypothesis, indicating that
the underlying distribution is not Poisson. As discussed above, the parameter estimates
are nonetheless consistent (provided the mean speci￿cation in equation (4) is correct), but
the overdispersion test indicates that Poisson-based maximum likelihood estimates of their
standard errors are not consistent. To obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors,
we employ the techniques of Rogers (1993), Huber (1967) and White (1980,1982).8 The
corresponding z-statistics are reported in Table 4.9
The results show a price elasticity of -4.61, which is fairly close to the average over the
individual product elasticities reported in Table 3. More favorable screen positions are also
shown to lead to increased clicks. Using the maintained hypothesis that conversion rates
are independent of screen position at the comparison site, one can interpret the e⁄ect on
demand of screen position as follows: All else equal, a ￿rm which is shifted by one rank in
its screen location experiences an 18.6% decrease in demand. These results con￿rm what we
saw earlier in Figure 3: There is a strong tendency for consumers to click on ￿rms in higher
positions, all else equal. This is consistent with the observation that, for search engines such
as Google, Overture, and Nextag, who auction screen position, there is a signi￿cant premium
associated with being located in the highest position.
Interestingly, while the coe¢ cient associated with being a bricks and clicks retailer has
the expected positive sign (0.262), it is not signi￿cant at conventional levels. One potential
reason for this is that, in light of the relationship we observed in Figure 5, the baseline model
8 Speci￿cally, we use the grouping technique of Rogers (1993) to relax the independence of observations
for a given ￿rm i across products and time. This allows potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in
the errors.
9 Some researchers have taken the view that the rejection of the null hypothesis of no overdispersion
warrants the use of a negative binomial speci￿cation. For this reason, we report ML estimates based on
the negative binomial (2) speci￿cation in Table A1. As that table shows, the parameter estimates are very
similar.
17is potentially misspeci￿ed because it assumes a representative ￿rm￿ s elasticity of demand is
independent of the number of ￿rms. As we shall see in Section 5, when we account for this,
together with the potential discontinuity in demand for the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price,
the coe¢ cient on bricks and clicks retailers remains positive and becomes signi￿cant.
To account for a potential relationship between a ￿rm￿ s elasticity of demand and the
number of competing seller in the pooled model, we modify equation (4) to allow individual
￿rm elasticities to depend on the number of listing ￿rms as follows:
E [QijtjXijt] = exp[(￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1)lnpijt + ￿2njt + ￿X1;ijt]; (5)
where njt denotes the number of ￿rms listing prices. Notice that, in this speci￿cation, the
elasticity of demand facing a representative ￿rm is given by
￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1:
Thus, ￿0 represents the elasticity of demand facing a monopoly seller, ￿0+￿1 represents the
elasticity of demand in duopoly PDA markets, and more generally, ￿1 represents the impact
on a ￿rm￿ s elasticity of demand of facing an additional competitor. In addition to our earlier
controls, we include the following:
The Number of Sellers. Besides the theoretical rationale for permitting a representative
￿rm￿ s elasticity of demand to depend on the number of sellers, one might expect the number
of clicks received by a particular ￿rm to directly depend on the number of sellers. For a given
consumer base, adding additional sellers would tend to reduce the expected number of clicks
enjoyed by any particular ￿rm. In addition, one might speculate that consumers are more
likely to click and purchase PDAs that are sold by more ￿rms, as additional ￿rms might
stimulate online sales by making the market appear more credible in the eyes of consumers.
As we will see below, our framework permits one to disentangle these two competing e⁄ects.
The resulting estimates are displayed in the Model 2 column of Table 4. As the table
shows, the number of sellers has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on clicks￿ both in terms of levels as
well as on price elasticities. Controlling for the number of ￿rms listing prices, we ￿nd that
the price elasticity of a monopoly seller is ￿3.761, which implies a gross margin of 26.6%.
Adding a second ￿rm to the market raises the price elasticity to around ￿4.049 and cuts the
18gross margin to 24.7%. When ten ￿rms list prices, the estimated elasticity becomes ￿6.641
or about 15.1% gross margins. These results suggest that the UK online market for PDAs
is extremely competitive. By way of comparison, the average gross margin for US electronic
shopping and mail order retailers (NAICS 4541) was 38.5%.10 The sign of the coe¢ cient
capturing the impact of the number of ￿rms listing prices on elasticity is also consistent with
the simple capacity constrained price setting model described above.
What is the impact of a change in the number of competing ￿rms on the overall numbers
of clicks for a speci￿c PDA? As we mentioned above, there is a direct e⁄ect as well as an
indirect e⁄ect from increased competitiveness. Taking the derivative of equation (5) and
evaluating it at the mean of our data yields
@ lnE [QijtjX]
@njt
j￿ pijt = ^ ￿1 ln ￿ pijt + ^ ￿2
= ￿:288(5:67) + 1:593;
or about ￿0:04 (p = :0155). It is useful to contrast this e⁄ect with the e⁄ect on numbers
of clicks of a change in screen position. As Table 4 shows, moving down one screen position
decreases the number of clicks by 17.5%. Thus, our estimates suggest that the impact on
clicks of screen position is more than four times larger than the impact on clicks of an
additional competitor appearing on the price comparison site.
While the above results are of some interest, there is reason to believe that the underlying
continuous demand model on which the estimated demand elasticities as well as the marginal
e⁄ects of screen location and the number of listings is misspeci￿ed. As we have emphasized,
the pseudo-maximum likelihood approach is robust against distributional assumptions but
not misspeci￿cation of the underlying mean of the stochastic process. We conclude this
section with a discussion of several potential problems that we address below.
4.3 Potential Misspeci￿cation
One may have a number of concerns regarding the estimates based on the continuous demand
speci￿cation in equation (5). First and foremost, price comparison sites are often used by
10 Source: Table 6. Estimated gross margin as a percent of sales by kind of business. US Census Bureau,
revised June 1, 2001.
19consumers looking to obtain a given product at the best price. For instance, Brynjolfsson and
Smith (2000) have provided evidence that 49 percent of consumers using price comparison
sites in the U.S. make purchase decisions based purely on price. The results of Ghose, et
al. seem to indicate a jump in a ￿rm￿ s demand when it sets the lowest price. Moreover,
recall that in our data (see Figure 3), 45 percent of the clicks are at the lowest price. These
observations, coupled with the recent literature that rationalizes the observed levels of price
dispersion in online markets (see Baye and Morgan, 2001; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten,
2004a) suggests that a ￿rm lowering its price from the second-lowest to the lowest price
enjoys a discontinuous jump in demand.
To see the potential rami￿cations of this on demand estimation, suppose there is a unit
mass of consumers, half of which are ￿shoppers￿who purchase at the lowest price and the
other half are ￿loyals￿who have a preference for a particular seller. Suppose consumers
within each group have identical demand functions given by D = p￿￿. A ￿rm that charges
the lowest price in the market enjoys demand from both groups, while a ￿rm charging a price
above the minimum price in the market sells only to its loyal customers. Figure 6 illustrates
the rami￿cations on demand estimation. The slope of the two steep lines through the data
are the same, and represent the true elasticity of demand, ￿￿, for prices above or below the
minimum price. At the minimum price, there is a discontinuous jump in demand owing to
the fact that the ￿rm attracts all of the shoppers at this price.
The dashed line through the data represents the elasticity estimate that results from
failing to take into account the discontinuous jump in demand that occurs when the ￿rm
charges the lowest price. Notice that, by ignoring the jump in demand at the lowest price,
one obtains an estimate of the true elasticity that overstates how responsive consumers are
to a change in price.
In addition to the potential problem caused by using a continuous demand speci￿cation
in the presence of ￿shoppers,￿two additional econometric issues are potentially relevant.
First, while there are sound theoretical reasons for elasticities (and per-￿rm demand) to
depend on the number of ￿rms listing prices, the estimates may be biased due to potential
endogeneity. In particular, popular products are likely to (for a given number of ￿rms) result
in a ￿rm receiving more clicks, and this may encourage additional ￿rms to enter the market.
20We attempted to control for this by including product dummies and interactions between
product and month dummies. However, endogeneity of the sort described above could, in
principle, still be a problem.
Second, while we have controlled for what seemed an important ￿rm characteristic￿
whether a ￿rm is a bricks and clicks retailer￿ a variety of unobserved ￿rm characteristics,
such as the degree of accumulated brand equity or di⁄erences in consumers￿perceptions of
￿rm quality, could also potentially bias our results. Thus, it may be important to try to
control for unobserved ￿rm characteristics in estimating demand.
We address these and other issues in the next section.
5 Discontinuous Demand and Unobserved Heterogene-
ity
We now turn to estimating demand in the presence of a mix of price-sensitive shoppers
and ￿loyals￿ . We ￿rst sketch the theory underlying the demand estimation. We then de-
scribe the estimating equation and report results. Finally, we examine issues associated with
endogeneity and unobserved ￿rm characteristics.
5.1 Theory and Estimation Strategy
Suppose that njt ￿rms numbered i = 1;2;:::;njt sell product j at a price comparison site on
date t. Let pijt denote the price of ￿rm i in the market for product j. A ￿rm in this market
sells to two types of consumers: Shoppers, who always purchase from the ￿rm charging the
lowest price, and loyals, who purchase from their preferred ￿rm. Because of the extreme
price sensitivity of shoppers, it is useful to de￿ne the set of ￿rms o⁄ering the ￿best￿(lowest)
price for product j at time t . De￿ne the set
Bjt = fi : pijt ￿ pkjt for all k 6= ig;
which is the set of ￿rms o⁄ering the ￿best￿price on this product date.
Let QS
ijt and QL
ijt denote the product j leads ￿rm i obtains from shoppers and loyals,
respectively, when charging the price pijt: Recall that ￿rm i obtains product j leads from
21shoppers only if it is in the set Bjt; that is, if it o⁄ers one of the best prices. Thus, the clicks







ijt if i 2 Bj
QL
ijt if i = 2 Bj
Thus, ￿rm i faces a ￿jump in demand￿for product j when it is among those ￿rms o⁄ering
the ￿best￿price for product j.
We utilize the following functional approach that facilitates structural estimation of de-
mand in a clearinghouse model. To account for the discontinuity in demand when the ￿rm
o⁄ers one of the best prices in the market, let Ijt be an indicator function that equals unity
when i 2 Bjt and zero otherwise, and let #Bjt denote the cardinality of Bjt; that is, the
number of ￿rms o⁄ering the best price for product j. Suppose that ￿rm i ￿ s elasticity of














ijt (X) and ￿S
ijt (X) represent the non-price determinants of leads (such as screen
location) on loyals and shoppers, respectively. To ease the notational burden, we suppress












































ijt ￿ ￿jt lnpijt (6)
In addition to the identifying restriction in Proposition 1, estimation requires imposing
additional structure on the parameters in equation (6). We assume a ￿rm￿ s elasticity of
demand for product j in period t is given by
￿jt = (￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1) (7)
22As in the previous section, this parsimonious speci￿cation takes into account the theoretical
relation between a ￿rm￿ s elasticity and the number of competing ￿rms. In addition, we allow
di⁄erent ￿rms to have di⁄erent numbers of loyals and shoppers, and also permit the number
of each to vary over time and across products. However, we assume
￿
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where X1;jt is the matrix of controls discussed earlier (position on screen, bricks and clicks
retailer, weekend, product dummies, month dummies, and product-month interaction dum-
mies). We continue to take as our maintained hypothesis that the identifying restrictions in
Proposition 1 hold so that (￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1) represents the elasticity of demand of a ￿rm
that faces njt ￿1 competitors. If, in addition, conversion rates are independent of t, Ijt, and
the cardinality of the number of ￿rms o⁄ering the lowest price #Bjt; one may interpret ￿
as the size of the jump in demand that a ￿rm enjoys when it o⁄ers the ￿best￿price. Notice
that the continuous demand model is nested in the speci￿cation of equation (8) when ￿ = 0:
Thus, the null hypothesis that the continuous ￿restriction￿on the discontinuous demand
model is true lends itself readily to testing.
5.2 Discontinuous Demand Estimates
Model 1 in Table 5 reports Pseudo-maximum Likelihood (PML) estimates of the parameters
in equation (8). Recall that under the nested model of continuous demand, the coe¢ cient
23associated with the demand shift from shoppers is predicted to equal zero. The alterna-
tive hypothesis, predicted from the clearinghouse literature, is that this coe¢ cient should
be positive. The coe¢ cient estimate for this e⁄ect is 0.603. Moreover, we can reject the
null hypothesis of the continuous demand model in favor of the (one-sided) alternative of
discontinuous demand at the 1% signi￿cance level. In short, we ￿nd considerable evidence
for a demand shift when a ￿rm o⁄ers the minimum price.
Figure 6 suggested that, were such a demand shift present, we should estimate demand
as being more elastic under the continuous demand model than when one accounts for the
potential demand discontinuity. Accounting for the discontinuity in demand, the estimated
elasticity goes from ￿3:761 (in Model 2 of Table 4) to ￿2.459 (in Model 1 of Table 5).
Translating this into gross margins, accounting for discontinuous demand changes raises
the estimated gross margin of a monopoly online seller from around 27% to around 40%.
This estimate seems quite reasonable in view of the 38.5% gross margin reported in the
Census data described above. Turning to the e⁄ect on elasticity of increasing numbers of
￿rms one again sees the same directional bias in the estimates of the continuous demand
model compared to the discontinuous demand model. Speci￿cally, the incremental e⁄ect of
an additional ￿rm on elasticity is reduced by around 12.5 percent (from ￿0:288 to ￿0:252)
when the demand shift from ￿shoppers￿is accounted for. Taken together, the coe¢ cient
estimates on log total price and log total price ￿ number of listings are consistent with
the e⁄ect on demand illustrated in Figure 6: The continuous demand model tends to yield
more elastic demand estimates than the discontinuous demand model when a demand shift
is present. We also note that, in contrast to the continuous demand speci￿cation, the e⁄ect
of a change in the number of ￿rms on a ￿rm￿ s overall demand
￿
@ lnE [QijtjX]=@njtj￿ pijt
￿
is
not statistically di⁄erent from zero (p = :4674).
It is of some interest to note the economic relevance of our estimate of ￿ (0:603). Other
things equal, a ￿rm that sets lowest price in the market enjoys a 60.3 percent increase in
demand, compared to the case where its price is not the lowest price. At the individual
￿rm level, ￿ may be interpreted as the ratio of the number of shoppers to the number of
consumers loyal to a particular ￿rm. Thus, for every 100 consumers loyal to a particular
￿rm, the representative ￿rm gains an additional 60 shoppers when it sets the lowest price.
24In contrast, notice that the position on screen coe¢ cient is only ￿0.175. This implies that a
￿rm would have to move up in its screen position more than 3 positions to generate the same
demand increase that results by setting the lowest price in the market. Finally it is worth
noting that, accounting for discontinuous demand, the e⁄ect of being a bricks and clicks
retailer is statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. The demand for a bricks and clicks
retailer is about 32.1 percent higher than that of a ￿rm that only has an online presence.
One may use the estimate of ￿ to obtain a crude gauge of the fraction of consumers using















































































































25which implies (given the estimate of ￿ = :603 reported in Model 1 of Table 5 and the
mean number of listings (4:05) in our data) that about 13 percent of consumers at Kelkoo
are Shoppers. While the symmetry assumptions used to obtain this crude estimate are at
odds with the data (among other things, the estimates suggest that bricks-and-clicks sellers
receive 32.1 percent more clicks than pure online sellers), it nonetheless illustrates that even
in online markets where only 13 percent of the consumers are ￿shoppers,￿the discontinuity
arising from these consumers can signi￿cantly impact elasticity estimates. Indeed, a ￿rm
that reduces its price just a penny below that of its rivals enjoys a 60 percent increase in
demand and an extremely ￿elastic￿overall response.
The results reported for Model 1 in Table 5, like those presented earlier for the contin-
uous demand speci￿cations, su⁄er from a number of potential problems. We conclude by
addressing some of these concerns.
Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity. One potential shortcoming of the PML approach used
in Model 1 of Table 5 is that the speci￿cation presumes there is no unobserved heterogeneity
across ￿rms. While we have attempted to control for di⁄erences across ￿rms that stem from
their having di⁄erent online and o› ine presences, as well as di⁄erent screen locations, it
is still possible that a particular ￿rm￿ s demand is also driven by unobserved factors. For
this reason, we also report in Table 5 results that allow for the e⁄ects of unobserved ￿rm
heterogeneity.
Model 2 in Table 5 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the discontinuous demand
model based on the random e⁄ects speci￿cation for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity pioneered
by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), while Model 3 reports conditional maximum likeli-
hood estimates based on a ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity. Note
that these results require the speci￿cation of the actual likelihood function, which we have
take to be Poisson. However, Table A2 in the appendix shows that the results reported in
Table 5 and discussed below are similar if one uses the likelihood function for a negative
binomial (2) speci￿cation.
Notice that, in both the random e⁄ects (Model 2) and ￿xed e⁄ects (Model 3) speci￿ca-
tions, the coe¢ cients of interest are roughly comparable to those obtained ignoring potential
unobserved heterogeneity (Model 1). The continuous demand model is once again nested
26(and rejected) in these speci￿cations. Further, the economic value of the coe¢ cient associated
with the demand shift is largely unchanged by allowing for potential unobserved heterogene-
ity. Likewise, the coe¢ cient associated with the elasticity of demand for a monopoly ￿rm
remains at about ￿2:5; similar to the estimate obtained in Model 1.
In contrast, the coe¢ cient associated with the marginal e⁄ect on price elasticity of chang-
ing the number of rivals is reduced in Models 2 and 3 compared to Model 1. One possibility
is that some ￿rms tend to sell in markets where there are a large number of rivals while
other ￿rms tend to sell products where there are only a small number of rivals. Allowing
for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity soaks up this variation which was previously ignored in
Model 1. Nonetheless, the results continue to suggest that it is important to account for the
degree of rivalry in online markets: ￿rms that face more rivals continue to face more elastic
demand.
Endogeneity. Another potential concern, which we alluded to earlier, is that the number
of ￿rms listing prices may be endogenous ￿ ￿rms may be more eager to list prices for products
where consumer demand is high, and thus the number of ￿rm e⁄ects documented earlier
might stem from spurious correlation. To examine this possibility, we used the test procedure
suggested by Wooldridge (1997); cf. Terza, (1998). The idea is to obtain instruments that
are correlated with the number of listings in our data but uncorrelated with the number
of clicks enjoyed by a particular ￿rm. One then uses standard techniques to regress the
number of listings on the instruments and the remaining control variables, compute the
resulting residuals from this regression, and then include these residuals as an additional
explanatory variable in the maximum likelihood estimation of the underlying count model.
The test is a simple LM test, which is conducted after estimating the model under the null
assumption that the coe¢ cients on these residual terms is zero.
As is the case with any endogeneity test, the power of this test depends on the availability
of good instruments. For this reason, we collected additional data from the U.S. which we
believe is likely to satisfy these conditions. In particular, for each of the PDAs in our UK
sample and for each date, we obtained data on that PDAs product popularity rating from
Shopper.com, a US price comparison site.11 This product popularity ranking is based on
11 The interested reader should consult Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004a) for additional details con-
27the lagged number of U.S. clickthroughs on the U.S. price comparison site. It seems likely
that the product popularity of an identical model PDA in the US is correlated with its
popularity in the UK. However, it is not likely to be correlated with the actual number
of clicks that particular U.K. sellers listing at the Kelkoo site received on any given date.
Among other things, it would be unusual for a US consumer using Shopper.com to cross the
￿virtual￿border and shop at UK price comparison sites such as Kelkoo. Indeed, as Table
1 showed, there would be little incentive for a US consumer to do so during the period of
our study. Since the e⁄ect of number of ￿rms listing prices enters both directly as well as
through an interaction term with ln(pijt) in the speci￿cation given in equation (8); we used
US product rank and product rank squared as instruments. Residuals were obtained based
on simultaneous estimation to obtain residuals for both number of ￿rms and the interaction
term.
Table 5 reports the results of the endogeneity tests for Models 1 through Model 3. In
all cases, there appears to be little evidence against the null hypothesis that the number of
￿rms is not endogenous. In short, it does not appear that the estimated e⁄ect of the number
of rival ￿rms on an online seller￿ s elasticity of demand is driven by an endogeneity problem
or unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Conclusions
We have developed identi￿cation restrictions which enable us to estimate demand elasticities
in online markets using only clicks data. We then showed that one can use pseudo-maximum
likelihood methods on these count data to obtain consistent estimates of an online seller￿ s
demand. Applying there methods to a unique data set for 18 models of PDAs sold at Yahoo!￿ s
European price comparison service, Kelkoo, we report estimates of the elasticity of demand
facing online retailers in the UK, as well as estimates of several other key determinants of
online demand.
In addition to providing a theoretical basis for demand estimation using clicks data,
there are three main messages that emerge from our analysis. First, in estimating an online
cerning data from this site.
28retailer￿ s elasticity of demand, it appears to be important to control for variation in the
number of rival ￿rms in the relevant online market. Our results suggest that a monopoly
seller faces an elasticity of demand of about ￿2.5, while a ￿rm￿ s demand becomes increasing
elastic as the number of rival sellers increases. In the most competitive markets we analyzed
(15 sellers), the elasticity of demand for a representative ￿rm￿ s product is about ￿6.0. This
￿nding may partially explain the wide array of elasticity estimates obtained in online markets
for books and computer memory. One potential explanation for these diverse estimates is
di⁄erences in the number of ￿rms￿ i.e., the rivalry of the industry: the online market for
books is considerably more concentrated than the online retail market for computer memory.
Second, our results provide some support for clearinghouse models that have been widely
used to model online competition. These models predict a ￿jump￿in a ￿rm￿ s demand when
it o⁄ers the lowest price. Indeed, our results indicate that such a jump is present in the data
and that the economic impact of the jump is signi￿cant. In the UK online market for PDAs,
a ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price enjoys a 60 percent increase in demand compared to what it
would have enjoyed had it not charged the lowest price. Moreover, we show that failing to
account for the jump in demand leads to biased elasticity estimates: Elasticity estimates in
the continuous demand speci￿cation are almost twice those obtained allowing for demand
discontinuities. Interestingly, we showed that estimates of the size of the ￿jump￿may be
used to obtain a crude estimate of the fraction of price sensitive ￿shoppers￿in the market.
For the case of the PDA market at Kelkoo, approximately 13 percent of online consumers are
shoppers who purchase at the lowest price, while it appears that 87 percent of the consumers
are loyal to particular sellers. Our results thus suggest that even a relatively small number of
￿shoppers￿can result in sizable jumps in ￿rm-level demand and a signi￿cant bias (if ignored)
in elasticity estimates.
Finally, we have identi￿ed several other potentially important determinants of online
demand. It appears that online consumers in the UK favor ￿rms that have both an online
as well as a brick and mortar presence: These ￿rms enjoy about 30 percent more sales than
their pure online competitors. Our results also suggest that UK consumers are clicking more
often at work than at home: online sales are about 27 percent lower on weekends than during
the week. We speculate that this is an artifact of the low (relative to the US) broadband
29penetration at residences, and probably overstates the weekend e⁄ect present in US data and
probably in the UK data going forward. Finally, as is the case in the physical marketplace,
location matters in the online world. We ￿nd that ￿rms listed at the top of the screen of
price quotes systematically receive more clicks than ￿rms listed further down the screen.
Indeed, we estimate that being shifted down one position on the screen costs a ￿rm about
15% of its clicks, even after controlling for price and other characteristics.
All of the results discussed above are robust to alternative assumptions regarding the
speci￿cation of likelihood functions, controls for potential unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity,
as well as endogeneity. Nonetheless, we stress that our interpretation of these results as
representing demand rather than clicks estimation critically depends on the assumption that
the identi￿cation restriction in Proposition 1 holds. Roughly, this requires that the rate at
which clicks are converted into ￿nal sales are, on average, independent of the underlying
price and other determinants observable at the Kelkoo site generating a click in the ￿rst
place.
While we believe these identi￿cation assumptions are reasonable, we conclude by noting
that our results are of economic interest even if the identifying restrictions do not hold. The
business models of many of the most successful online ￿rms such as Google and Yahoo! are
built on revenues derived from clicks (not from the conversion of clicks into sales). Thus,
understanding the determinants of click behavior in the online marketplace is arguably as
important as understanding the demand facing individual ￿rms selling in the online market-
place.
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Coefficient Estimate Significant at the 1% Level








Firm i’s Actual 
DemandUK US UK US UK US
Handspring Treo 90 130 95 1.94 22.23 0.25 0.10
HP Compaq IPAQ 1910 216 N/A 2.63 N/A 0.11 N/A
HP Compaq IPAQ 1940 267 174 8.09 27.20 0.08 0.07
HP Compaq IPAQ 2210 319 228 6.57 27.95 0.07 0.08
HP Compaq IPAQ 3950 279 172 1.30 4.95 0.01 0.13
HP Compaq IPAQ 3970 317 N/A 1.35 N/A 0.01 N/A
HP Compaq IPAQ 5550 452 372 7.67 25.99 0.05 0.08
Palm m515 195 191 1.05 6.56 0.01 0.20
Palm Tungsten T2 269 198 6.11 31.79 0.07 0.12
Palm Tungsten W 390 229 2.66 27.72 0.08 0.14
Palm Zire 71 200 167 7.21 31.93 0.07 0.10
Sony Clie NX70V 283 272 2.13 15.58 0.21 0.25
Sony Clie NX73V 381 245 4.51 31.58 0.08 0.09
Sony Clie NZ90 537 435 1.51 27.35 0.03 0.09
Sony Clie SJ22 147 87 3.32 26.51 0.09 0.10
Sony Clie SJ33 171 121 1.02 10.94 0.00 0.10
Sony Clie TG50 269 174 3.86 32.72 0.06 0.10
Toshiba E740 WIFI 435 195 1.95 12.40 0.20 0.27
Overall 305 206 3.87 24.36 0.09 0.12
Note: Median price denotes the average over all dates of the median price on each date. US prices are denominated in £ at the daily USD/£ exchange 
rate. Coefficients of variation include listings in which there is only a single firm. If we omit single firm listings, unweighted overall coefficient of 
variation in the UK increases to 11% and in the US to 12.1%.
Median Price (£)
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics-UK and US Price Level Comparisons







Clicks 3.33 4.27 2 0 5 36 0
Price 304.88 106.84 279.98 229.99 396.63 601.95 104.57
Shipping 4.16 4.50 3.95 0 5.82 17.63 0
Total Price 309.04 107.01 283.94 234.42 396.63 607.77 108.10
Number of listings of the product 4.05 2.93 3 2 6 15 1
Location on Screen 3.40 2.43 3 1 5 15 1
D(Bricks and Clicks Retailer = 1) 0.29
D(Weekend =1) 0.28
D(Month = September) 0.11
D(Month = October) 0.29
D(Month = November) 0.29
D(Month = December) 0.27
D(Month = January) 0.05
Total Number of Products = 18
Total Number of Firms = 19
Total Number of Dates = 111
Total Number of Observations = 6151













Toshiba E740 WIFI -1.75 0.272 -0.214 4 216 2.093
(8.64)** (3.23)** (2.35)*
HP Compaq IPAQ 1910 -3.281 -0.591 -0.215 2 171 3.012
(5.68)** (4.73)** (2.29)*
HP Compaq IPAQ 1940 -14.691 -0.165 -0.255 4 898 8.942
(20.39)** (13.98)** (4.45)**
HP Compaq IPAQ 2210 -11.725 -0.058 -0.251 1 184 6.652
(10.54)** (2.04)* (2.43)*
HP Compaq IPAQ 3950 1.961 -0.351 -0.152 3 91 1.462
(1.56) (1.02) (0.62)
HP Compaq IPAQ 3970 -1.53 -0.262 -0.12 4 131 1.809
(1.91) (3.10)** (1.14)
HP Compaq IPAQ 5550 -13.712 -0.153 -0.288 4 851 8.055
(22.97)** (13.92)** (5.17)**
Palm m515 -2.503 -0.458 -0.444 2 44 1.091
(3.88)** (0.99) (2.82)**
Sony Clie NX70V -2.455 -0.227 -0.116 3 164 2.354
(9.41)** (2.99)** (0.91)
Sony Clie NX73V -5.941 -0.258 -0.163 4 501 4.928
(10.82)** (7.18)** (1.73)
Sony Clie NZ90 -2.884 -0.144 -0.331 4 151 1.821
(1.51) (0.82) (1.60)
Sony Clie SJ22 -3.263 -0.085 -0.278 4 368 3.728
(8.65)** (3.04)** (3.54)**
A#f l ii Sony Clie SJ33 0.182 -0.215 2 44 1.045
(0.08) (1.51)
Sony Clie TG50 -6.188 -0.049 -0.202 4 428 5.178
(6.28)** (1.22) (1.87)
Handspring Treo 90 -4.375 -0.723 -0.225 2 136 1.985
(1.67) (0.79) (2.92)**
Palm Tungsten T2 -6.096 -0.153 -0.265 4 678 6.587
(11.90)** (6.30)** (3.04)**
Palm Tungsten W -3.902 -0.328 -0.406 4 295 3.115
(4.37)** (4.08)** (2.30)*
Palm Zire 71 -11.115 -0.157 -0.316 4 800 7.978
(11.47)** (7.71)** (3.65)**
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%. ** Significant at 1%.
Table 3: Product Specific Demand EstimatesModel 1 Model 2
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Poisson PML Poisson PML
Log Total Price -4.61 -3.761
(8.91)** (7.45)**
Log Total Price x Number of Listings -0.288
(4.14)**
Number of listings of the product 1.593
(4.05)**
Position on Screen -0.186 -0.175
(4.54)** (4.47)**
Bricks and Clicks Retailer 0.262 0.236
(1.58)                       (1.67)                        
Weekend -0.242 -0.265
(10.82)** (11.46)**
Product Dummies 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes
Observations 6151 6151
z statistics in parentheses




Table 4: Continuous Demand EstimatesModel 1 Model 2 Model 3
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Poisson PML Poisson ML Poisson CML
Log Total Price -2.459 -2.487 -2.49
(9.11)** (24.78)** (24.74)**
Log Total Price x Number of Listings -0.252 -0.146 -0.145
(4.60)** (8.82)** (8.71)**
Demand Shift from Shoppers 0.603 0.62 0.621
(7.11)** (27.84)** (27.80)**
Number of listings of the product 1.415 0.833 0.824
(4.52)** (8.94)** (8.84)**
Position on Screen -0.175 -0.153 -0.152
(4.37)** (22.08)** (21.81)**
Bricks and Clicks Retailer 0.321 0.373
(2.41)* (1.87)                        
Weekend -0.268 -0.26 -0.26
(13.79)** (15.51)** (15.50)**
Product Dummies 17 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55 55
Controls for Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity No
19 - Random 
Effects
19 - Fixed 
Effects
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes No No
Observations 6151 6151 6151
z statistics in parentheses





Chi-Square 2.64 1.44 1.45
P-Value 0.267 0.488 0.485
Table 5: Discontinuous Demand EstimatesModel 1 Model 2





Log Total Price -4.81 -3.696
(10.29)** (8.66)**
Log Total Price x Number of Listings -0.343
(5.54)**
Number of listings of the product 1.897
(5.37)**
Position on Screen -0.178 -0.166
(4.70)** (4.46)**




Product Dummies 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes
Observations 6151 6151
z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table A1: Continuous Demand Estimates - Alternative SpecificationsModel 1 Model 2 Model 3







Log Total Price -2.343 -2.372 -2.359
(8.18)** (17.31)** (17.12)**
Log Total Price x Number of Listings -0.314 -0.139 -0.137
(5.38)** (6.28)** (6.18)**
Demand Shift from Shoppers 0.619 0.594 0.597
(8.24)** (19.49)** (19.56)**
Number of listings of the product 1.77 0.782 0.774
(5.30)** (6.31)** (6.21)**
Position on Screen -0.166 -0.146 -0.144
(4.31)** (15.92)** (15.36)**
Bricks and Clicks Retailer 0.324 0.266
(2.66)** (2.81)**
Weekend -0.29 -0.246 -0.245
(14.86)** (10.98)** (10.97)**
Product Dummies 17 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55 55
Controls for Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity No
19 - Random 
Effects
19 - Fixed 
Effects
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes No No
Observations 6151 6151 6151
z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Endogeneity Test
Chi-Square 4.67 0.55 0.64
P-Value 0.0967 0.7578 0.7261
Table A2: Discontinuous Demand Estimates - Alternative Specifications